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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
recovery of real estate and untenable for personal injuries? "Are
property rights, strictly speaking, of more importance to the infant
than the rights of person?"
SPECIFIC PERFORMANcE-EQUITABLE JURISDICTION-In 1919, the
appellant Bockler contracted to buy from Wurfel certain realty on
which was located a store building together with the merchandise
contained therein. Part of the purchase price was to be paid in cash,
the balance by delivery of a deed of a lot in Portland. Appellant
moved upon the premises where he remained for five years. Wurfel,
after considerable trouble perfected his title and tendered a deed which
was not accepted. He sued for specific performance.
The court
denied a decree, finding that his title was defective as to part of the
realty and -that the lot to be deeded by Bockler was owned by his
wife who had not joined in the contract. Mrs. Bockler then began
an action to have removed an alleged cloud upon her title. Her husband was joined as a party defendant. Held, that Mrs. Bockler was
the absolute owner of the Portland lot, that Wurfel should recover
from the appellant Bockler $3500, the agreed value of the lot, and
made this sum a lien upon the property purchased. Pending appeal,
Wurfel issued execution and at the public sale became the purchaser
of the property. Bockler v. Wurfel, et al., 254 Pac. 353 (Sup. Ct.
Oregon, 1927).
Appellant's principal objection was that the result was wholly
inequitable, his vendor now having both the property and a substantial part of the purchase price. This seemingly carried force, but the
court pointed out that the vendee had had the use of the store for
five years and quoted from his testimony to show the value of the
business to him. The appellant's further objection that the passage of
time precluded a decree of specific performance of the original agreement was disapproved. Time was not of the essence, the vendor
had perfected his title without having been guilty of laches, and the
court could at this time properly decree specific performance of the
original agreement to the extent possible. Katz v. Hathaway, 66
Wash. 355, 119 Pac. 804 (1911).
The trial court in proceeding to dispose finally of the entire controversy was held to have properly exercised its equitable jurisdiction.
This accords with general principles of Equity and with the doctrine
of similar cases. Wood v. Hill 214 App. Div. 417, 212 N. Y. Supp.
550 (1925).; Madsen v. Bonneville Irr. Dist., 65 Utah 571, 239 Pac. 781
(1925). As was well said in Brown v. Winne, 92 Okla. 289, 219 Pac.
114 (1923), "A Court of Equity which once obtains jurisdiction of a
controversy administers complete relief."
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